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STANDING IN THE FUTURE: THE CASE 
FOR A SUBSTANTIAL RISK THEORY OF 
“INJURY IN FACT” IN CONSUMER DATA 
BREACH CLASS ACTIONS 
Abstract: The increasing digitalization of our personal and professional lives has 
generated corresponding growth in the amount of electronically stored private in-
formation in the hands of third parties. That private information is at risk of theft, 
loss, or manipulation. Employers that hold employee tax information and mer-
chants that hold significant troves of consumer credit card data are particularly 
attractive targets. When hackers strike, victims often band together in federal 
class actions, naming the custodians of their private data as defendants. More and 
more, however, district courts are dismissing these class action claims at the 
doorstep for lack of Article III standing. The corporate defendants argue, and 
many courts agree, that a plaintiff’s alleged increased risk of future data misap-
propriation is insufficient to satisfy the U.S. Supreme Court’s test for an “injury 
in fact,” a critical component of the traditional standing analysis. This Note ar-
gues that many consumer data breach class actions do in fact satisfy the Supreme 
Court’s standing requirements, as outlined in the Court’s 2013 decision in Clap-
per v. Amnesty International USA and its 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the age of the Internet consumer market, merchants and service provid-
ers hold increasing amounts of private personal data in their databases and on 
their servers.1 With this vast amount of data storage comes increased risk that 
thieves and rouges, from both inside and outside a custodian entity, will breach 
the security protecting individual personal information.2 Because the federal 
Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) provides a lower threshold for Article III 
diversity jurisdiction in multistate class actions than in traditional diversity 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY 8–9, 22 (May 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-
transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5WJP-RKHS]; J. Thomas Richie, Data Breach Class Actions, BUS. LITIG. COMMIT-
TEE NEWSL. (ABA), Winter 2015, at 12 (examining trends in data breach litigation). 
 2 See Timothy H. Madden, Data Breach Class Action Litigation—A Tough Road for Plaintiffs, 55 
BOS. B.J. 27, 28 (2011) (describing litigation challenges for plaintiffs in data breach class actions); 
Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability: Data Security and Personal Information, in SECURING PRI-
VACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 111–12 (Anupam Chander et al., eds. 2008). 
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suits, many data breach cases are brought in federal district courts.3 As courts 
of limited jurisdiction, the district courts are required to ensure cases are 
properly before them as a threshold matter.4 Among other required components 
of proper jurisdiction, plaintiffs must have standing to sue.5 Plaintiffs bear the 
burden of showing standing at every stage of litigation, and must allege suffi-
cient facts to support their right to sue at the pleading stage or risk dismissal 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).6 
In data breach class actions, often the most difficult aspect of standing for 
plaintiffs to adequately allege is that they have suffered an “injury in fact.”7 In 
essence, plaintiffs must show that they themselves have suffered the invasion 
of a legally protected right, and that their injury is neither hypothetical nor 
conjectural.8 In many cases, data breach plaintiffs have not suffered actual 
misappropriation of their personal data, but are at increased risk for future data 
misuse.9 The federal circuits have split on the adequacy of a future misappro-
priation theory of injury in fact, with some finding standing and others dis-
missing suits for want of it.10 Many district courts assess the future misappro-
priation theory in light of the 2013 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Clapper v. 
Amnesty International USA, which was decided in the context of a challenge to 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”).11 
This is Note argues that Clapper may not have narrowed the standing in-
quiry as much as some district courts have concluded, and that there are valid 
reasons even in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Clapper to uphold 
Article III standing in at least some future injury theory data breach class ac-
                                                                                                                           
 3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012) (waiving the complete diversity requirement for certain class 
action cases and allowing for the aggregation of claims to determine amount in controversy). 
 4 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005) (explaining that 
district courts are “courts of limited jurisdiction”); Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 
379, 382 (1884) (explaining that U.S. courts have a continuing sua sponte duty to inquire into proper 
jurisdiction); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). 
 5 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). 
 6 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (confirming that standing is an “irre-
ducible constitutional minimum”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (estab-
lishing basic standing requirements). 
 7 Richie, supra note 1, at 14. 
 8 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 9 Richie, supra note 1, at 14 (noting cases in Ohio, Missouri, and Massachusetts where federal 
courts dismissed cases for lack of standing where plaintiffs failed to allege actual misappropriation of 
their personal information). 
 10 See Katz v. Pershing, LLC (Katz II), 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (discussing the split); see 
also Richie, supra note 1, at 14 (observing that the federal circuits have diverged on standing issues in 
consumer data breach class actions). 
 11 See Richie, supra note 1, at 10 (noting the impact that the Clapper decision has had on lower 
courts). See generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (a standing case that 
implicated the future injury analysis). 
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tions.12 Part I reviews the state of standing in the federal circuits and at the Su-
preme Court as it relates to data breach cases.13 Part II provides a summary of 
the factual background and the Court’s decision in Clapper.14 Part III argues 
that the Court’s opinion in Clapper embraces both a “certainly impending” 
injury theory and a “substantial risk” of injury theory for Article III standing, 
depending on the nature of the case.15 Part IV argues that at least some data 
breach cases meet the requisite criteria for consideration under a substantial 
risk of injury theory of standing.16 
I. DATA, BREACH, AND THE STATE OF STANDING 
 This Part begins in Section A with a brief examination of digitally stored 
information, and then sketches the challenges associated with its security.17 
Section B explores the state of the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine, espe-
cially as it relates to consumer data breach class actions.18 
A. Personal Data in the Modern World 
Humanity produces 2.5 quintillion bytes of data daily.19 One recent study 
concluded that the amount of data housed on the Internet in 2020 will be forty-
four times larger than in 2009.20 Companies have been quick to capitalize on 
this newfound source of consumer information, with U.S. Internet revenue 
reaching $42.8 billion in 2013.21 A single data analytics company, Acxiom, 
recorded $850 million in revenue during 2015.22 Consumer data now consti-
tutes a more than $300 billion industry.23 
Companies are not, however, the only actors interested in capitalizing on 
the growth of personal information.24 Along with all of this increased data have 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 171–267 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 17–83 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 84–109 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 110–170 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 171–267 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 19–36 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 37–83 and accompanying text. 
 19 What Is Big Data?, IBM, www-01.ibm.com/software/data/bigdata/what-is-big-data.html 
[https://perma.cc/B78K-C9QM] (last visited on Jan. 17, 2017). 
 20 Billy Ehrenberg, How Much Is Your Personal Data Worth?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/apr/22/how-much-is-personal-data-worth [https://
perma.cc/7G2R-JD4W]. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Acxiom Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year Results, ACXIOM (May 17, 2016), 
http://investors.acxiom.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=971434 [https://perma.cc/XR5Y-Q7TT]. 
 23 Jason Morris & Ed Lavandera, Why Big Companies Buy, Sell Your Data, CNN (Aug. 23, 
2012), www.cnn.com/2012/08/23/tech/web/big-data-acxiom [https://perma.cc/V4CC-33PN]. 
 24 See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1 (providing an overview of the variety of 
organizations involved in the growth of personal data supplies). 
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come significant security challenges, and companies have been slow to react.25 
Hackers gained access to more than 177 million individual records in 2015.26 
Many breaches are at large companies and affect significant numbers of con-
sumers.27 In late 2013, Target acknowledged that hackers had gained access to 
forty million credit card records.28 A year later, Home Depot announced an 
even bigger consumer credit card breach.29 In December 2016, Yahoo an-
nounced that hackers had gained unauthorized access to more than one billion 
accounts.30 That announcement came on top of a similar disclosure by Yahoo 
in September 2016, where the Internet giant conceded that 500 million ac-
counts were compromised.31 
Ordinary victims of data breach experience a diversity of injuries.32 For 
many, compromised credit cards are simply canceled and reissued.33 Others are 
compensated for unauthorized charges by the card-issuing banks.34 Some, 
however, have their identities stolen and their credit ruined.35 Victims have 
sought redress for these problems in the courts.36 
B. Future Injury Standing and the Circuit Split 
On December 23, 2010, Brenda Katz filed a class action lawsuit in the 
Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts, pursuant to Massachu-
                                                                                                                           
 25 See Victoria L. Schwartz, Corporate Privacy Failures Start at the Top, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1693, 
1694–96 (describing a series of corporate security failures and the corporations’ responses). 
 26 IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., DATA BREACH REPORTS 4 (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.
idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/DataBreachReports_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/46CW-Z229]. 
 27 See Claire Groden, Here’s Who’s Been Hacked in the Past Two Years, FORTUNE (Oct. 2, 
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/02/heres-whos-been-hacked-in-the-past-two-years/ [https://perma.
cc/V7YX-A7XQ] (providing a list of some of the largest data breaches between 2013 and 2015). 
 28 Hiroko Tabuchi, $10 Million Settlement in Target Data Breach Gets Preliminary Approval, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/business/target-settlement-on-
data-breach.html [https://perma.cc/RE65-8VAK]. 
 29 Robin Sidel, Home Depot’s 56 Million Card Breach Bigger Than Target’s, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
18, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/home-depot-breach-bigger-than-targets-1411073571 [https://
perma.cc/3KPC-XP3W]. 
 30 Seth Fiegerman, Yahoo Says Data Stolen from 1 Billion Accounts, CNN (Dec. 15, 2016), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/12/14/technology/yahoo-breach-billion-users/ [https://perma.cc/AY6Z-
JB9R]. 
 31 Id. 
 32 N. ERIC WEISS & RENA S. MILLER, THE TARGET AND OTHER FINANCIAL DATA BREACHES: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 18–19 (Cong. Research Serv. Feb. 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R43496.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KEL-UZ32]. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id.  
 35 See Kara Brandeisky, These Are the Only Data Breaches You Really Need to Worry About, 
TIME (Mar. 18, 2015), http://time.com/money/3746449/identity-theft-hacked-what-do/ [https://perma.
cc/X9PD-PC69]. 
 36 See Richie, supra note 1 (examining growing numbers of consumer data breach class actions). 
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setts data privacy laws.37 Katz held a brokerage account with an “introducing 
firm” that utilized clearing services provided by Pershing, LLC.38 Her com-
plaint alleged that Pershing’s protection of her non-public personal information 
was inadequate, and that its fees for this inadequate protection were unfairly 
passed on to consumers.39 In addition to pleading various contract, common 
law, misrepresentation, and consumer protection claims, Katz relied on provi-
sions of Massachusetts state consumer data privacy laws, and sued on behalf of 
herself and all others similarly situated.40 Pershing moved to dismiss the law-
suit under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) arguing that 
Katz lacked the required constitutional and statutory standing to sue.41 The 
District Court granted the motion.42 
Katz originally filed her complaint in federal district court pursuant to 
CAFA, codified at 28 U.S.C § 1332(d).43 CAFA provides the federal district 
courts with subject matter jurisdiction over class actions that are minimally 
diverse, so long as there are at least one hundred plaintiffs and the amount in 
controversy exceeds five million dollars.44 Because her state law claims were 
filed in federal court, Katz was required to show constitutional standing to pur-
sue the case under the federal jurisdictional grant in Article III, in addition to 
statutory standing for her state law claims.45 The resulting decision from the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 2012, upholding the dismissal, 
highlighted a profound split among the federal circuits on the issue of constitu-
tional standing for consumers alleging improper storage or compromise of 
their personal data.46 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Katz v. Pershing, LLC (Katz I), 806 F. Supp. 2d 452, 455 (D. Mass. 2011). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 456. 
 43 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012); Class Action Complaint at 3, Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 806 
F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Mass. 2011) (1:10-cv-12227-RGS). 
 44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) in Febru-
ary 2005. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)). In the first section of CAFA, Congress outlined its rationale for 
providing a lower threshold for invoking federal jurisdiction in class actions, finding that “[o]ver the 
past decade, there have been abuses of the class action device . . . .” Id. § 2(a)(2). These difficulties 
included damage to defendants who have acted responsibly and plaintiffs with legitimate claims, un-
duly large awards to certain plaintiffs while others received very little, and cases where plaintiffs’ 
counsel received large contingency fees and actual plaintiffs received as little as a coupon. See id. 
§ 2(a)(2)–(3). To solve these perceived problems, Congress sought to “restore the intent of the framers 
of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of 
national importance under diversity jurisdiction . . . .” Id. § 2(b)(2). 
 45 Katz II, 672 F.3d at 71; see also Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 n.3 
(1994) (explaining that plaintiffs are required to show standing at the outset). 
 46 See Katz II, 672 F.3d at 80 (acknowledging the inconsistent approaches taken by other federal 
circuits). 
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 Article III of the Constitution limits the federal judiciary’s jurisdiction to 
“cases” or “controversies.”47 Over time, the Supreme Court has developed a 
standing jurisprudence that is designed in large part to ensure compliance with 
this constitutional mandate.48 In recent years, the Court has developed a stand-
ard test for lower courts to apply in considering this threshold issue.49 This test 
was clearly summarized in the Court’s 1992 decision in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife.50 In that case, the Court drew on aspects of several prior holdings to 
generate the three essential requirements of constitutional standing.51 
First, plaintiffs must show that they have suffered an actual injury in fact.52 
The Court defined injury in fact as “an invasion of a legally protected interest 
which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent and not con-
jectural or hypothetical.”53 Second, plaintiffs must show that the injury in fact is 
causally connected to the acts or omissions of the defendant—the injury must be 
“fairly traceable” to the conduct at issue.54 Finally, the defendant must show the 
likelihood that there is a legal remedy for the injury; that is, it must be likely that 
“the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”55 The Court reaffirmed 
Lujan’s basic requirements in its 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, a case 
involving alleged misuse of personal information.56  
In data breach class actions, like the one brought by Brenda Katz, the in-
jury-in-fact analysis—the first prong of the Lujan test—is often the most com-
                                                                                                                           
 47 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Several prominent commentators, including The Chief Justice 
Roberts, have argued that the standing requirement in Article III serves the essential purpose of ensur-
ing proper separation of powers, by prohibiting the judiciary from providing advisory opinions or 
ruling on matters of policy. See, e.g., John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 
DUKE L. J. 1219, 1220 (1993); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) 
(quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 
464, 474 (1982)) (stating that “this Court has recognized that the case-or-controversy limitation is 
crucial in maintaining the tripartite allocation of power set forth in the Constitution”) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 48 See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154–55 (1990) (explaining that standing inquiry is 
essential for compliance with Article III); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (finding that the 
requirement of Article III standing is “founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—
role of the courts in a democratic society”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198–200 (1962) (determin-
ing that violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee affecting the particular 
plaintiffs involved in the suit satisfied the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III); Fairchild 
v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922) (holding that Article III does not provide standing for private 
citizens to challenge alleged violations of public rights). 
 49 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (citing cases from the Court have that have helped develop the 
standard). 
 50 See id. at 560. 
 51 See id. at 560–61. 
 52 Id. at 560. 
 53 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 55 Id. at 561 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. 
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plex.57 This is because the injuries alleged are prospective; the plaintiffs are 
concerned about the future misappropriation of their personal information.58 
Absent definitive guidance on the application of the “actual or imminent” 
standard outlined in Lujan to these particular kinds of future injuries, the fed-
eral circuits analyzed data breach claims in differing ways.59 
When called upon to decide whether Brenda Katz had standing to sue, the 
First Circuit was thus confronted with a substantial disagreement between its 
sister circuits.60 To begin, the court dismissed all of Katz’s common law, mis-
representation, and consumer protection claims as insufficiently plead or lack-
ing justiciability for various reasons.61 All that remained were her claims for 
violations of the Massachusetts data privacy laws.62 The First Circuit ultimate-
ly agreed with the district court that Katz lacked Article III standing because 
she could not show that her personal information was actually compromised, 
but the court indicated in dicta a possible willingness to consider a theory of 
injury centered on future misappropriation of actually compromised data.63 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See Katz I, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 457 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61, and noting that several 
federal district courts have dismissed similar probabilistic standing arguments in data breach cases as 
not satisfying the injury-in-fact requirement); David L. Silverman, Developments in Data Security 
Breach Liability, 70 BUS. LAW. 231, 236–37 (2014/2015) (collecting cases and analyzing injury-in-
fact allegations after defendants moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12). 
 58 See Angelo A. Stio III et al., Standing and the Emerging Law of Class Actions, 2015 N.J. LAW. 
49, 49–50 (noting standing challenge for data breach class action plaintiffs). 
 59 Compare Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41–42 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding a future injury 
too speculative under the standard announced in Lujan), with Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 
1139, 1141–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding future injury based standing in light of the standard set out in 
Lujan). 
 60 See Katz II, 672 F.3d at 80 (noting the circuit split and distinguishing the case at bar on the 
facts). 
 61 See id. at 72–78. With respect to Katz’s common law claims for breach of contract, the court 
concluded that Katz had standing, but failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under 
New York law (which applied as to the contractual provisions she and Pershing agreed to). See id. 
Consequently, the court dismissed those claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. 
 62 See id. at 78. Contrary to the district court, for the purposes of determining federal standing and 
jurisdiction, the First Circuit assumed, without deciding, that Massachusetts data privacy laws includ-
ed a private right of action. See id. 
 63 See id. at 80 (“[T]he risk of harm that [Katz] envisions is unanchored to any actual incident of 
data breach. This omission is fatal: because she does not identify any incident in which her data has 
ever been accessed by an unauthorized person, she cannot satisfy Article III’s requirement of actual or 
impending injury.”). Katz raised two primary allegations with respect to the Massachusetts data priva-
cy statute. Id. The first came from Pershing’s failure to provide adequate security measures, and her 
assumption that numerous breaches must have occurred. Id. Katz further argued that the statute re-
quired notification of those breaches, and that Pershing failed to notify her as required. Id. The court 
dispensed with that allegation quickly, noting that Katz was unable to point to a single instance of 
actual unauthorized access or misappropriation of her personal data. See id. In analyzing the injury-in-
fact requirement, the court analogized to Lujan. See id. at 78. The court held that Lujan and a series of 
other environmental standing cases instruct courts to dismiss cases where the only alleged injury is the 
defendant’s failure to meet a particular legal requirement, if that failure does not create an injury in 
fact for the plaintiff. See id. 
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The essence of Katz’s claim was that Pershing’s failure to adhere to par-
ticular Massachusetts privacy regulations increased the risk of misappropria-
tion and the resultant harm.64 The court noted a significant circuit split with 
respect to this theory of injury, but concluded that Katz’s case was distinguish-
able from the cases that embraced the theory.65 Her case did “not mirror” those 
that found injury in fact for future misappropriation of compromised data be-
cause she did not plead any facts suggestive of actual data compromise.66 In 
other words, because Katz could not show that her data was ever actually sto-
len or leaked from Pershing, the future injury theory was unavailable.67 
Though the First Circuit never squarely addressed the future misappropri-
ation theory of injury in fact for a case where data was truly lost, several other 
circuits have, and reached opposite conclusions.68 Krottner v. Starbucks, a 
2010 case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, is paradigmat-
ic of the future data misappropriation injury theory.69 In that case, a laptop was 
stolen that contained the unencrypted personal data of 97,000 Starbucks em-
ployees on its hard drive.70 Most of the plaintiffs did not allege that their data 
had been misused, but pointed to the increased risk of future misuse.71 The 
Ninth Circuit found that such an injury was sufficient to confer Article III 
standing, noting that plaintiffs who have plead “a credible threat of harm” that 
is “not conjectural or hypothetical,” have established their right to sue.72 In so 
holding, the Ninth Circuit implicitly found that the threat of future data misap-
propriation is both “credible” and “not hypothetical.”73 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached a similar con-
clusion in 2007, in Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp.74 There, the court analo-
gized the enhanced risk of future data misappropriation theory to other cases 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Id. at 78. 
 65 Id. at 80. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 79. 
 68 See id. at 80 (noting that “[t]he allegations in [the] case do not mirror” cases where standing 
was found after plaintiffs alleged actual data breach occurred); see also Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143 
(finding that plaintiffs had adequately plead injury in fact when a laptop containing personal infor-
mation of 97,000 employees was stolen); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632, 634 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (concluding that future risk of injury resulting from a “sophisticated, intentional and mali-
cious” banking database intrusion was an adequate injury in fact). 
 69 See Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142 (concluding that increased risk of data misuse was sufficient 
injury). 
 70 Id. at 1140. 
 71 Id. at 1142. One employee did allege that an unknown individual attempted to open a bank 
account with his social security number, but the bank closed the offending account before any finan-
cial loss was incurred. Id. 
 72 Id. at 1143. 
 73 See id. (reviewing injury-in-fact requirements for Article III standing and concluding that, “on 
these facts,” injury in fact had been adequately pleaded). 
 74 See Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634. 
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both inside and outside of the Seventh Circuit that found standing in situations 
where plaintiffs alleged increased risk of future injuries.75 The court examined 
cases involving elevated risk of future injury from exposure to toxic substances, 
the possibility of future health problems associated with defective medical de-
vices, and the increased risk of the loss of retirement benefits based on an 
ERISA plan administrator’s increased discretion.76 The court concluded that “the 
injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of future harm . . . .”77 
In 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit took a very differ-
ent view in its decision in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.78 In that case, a payroll pro-
cessing company suffered a data breach that exposed approximately 27,000 in-
dividuals to at least some potential misappropriation of social security numbers, 
full names, and in some cases birthdates and bank account numbers.79 The plain-
tiffs in the resulting class action plead, among other present injuries, the in-
creased risk of future identity theft.80 Citing Whitmore and Lujan, the Third Cir-
cuit found that this theory of injury in fact was hypothetical and did not give rise 
to Article III standing.81 The court found that Whitmore precluded standing for 
allegations of “possible future injury,” and concluded that where plaintiffs have 
alleged no actual misuse of personal data stemming from the breach, there is no 
injury.82 The court explicitly rejected the reasoning of both the Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits, finding that the facts before it closely paralleled Lujan and noting 
that the Supreme Court has routinely dismissed cases for lack of standing when 
future injuries that are not “certainly impending” are alleged.83 
II. GUIDANCE FROM THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CLAPPER V. AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL USA 
 This Part examines constitutional standing doctrine in light of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2013 opinion in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, with 
particular focus on the decision’s consequences for data breach plaintiffs at the 
pleading stage.84 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See id. at 634 n.3 (citing class action cases involving toxic torts, medical device manufacturing 
defects, and environmental damage or pollution). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. The court affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit, however, because there was no state law 
remedy under traditional Illinois tort and contract law, absent a showing of actual damages. See id. at 
640. 
 78 See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42–43 (concluding that increased risk of future data misappropriation 
does not satisfy Article III standing requirements). 
 79 Id. at 40. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 42. 
 82 Id. at 42, 44. 
 83 Id. at 42, 44–45. 
 84 See infra notes 85–109 and accompanying text. 
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The Court’s decision in Clapper provided additional guidance for courts 
analyzing prospective injuries related to misappropriation of personal data and 
communications under the Court’s 1992 decision in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife.85 The Clapper plaintiffs were a collection of non-profits and news 
media organizations conducting significant communication and research with 
overseas entities, often in areas of strategic intelligence importance to the 
United States.86 The plaintiffs were concerned that provisions of FISA, which 
allows the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to approve federal wiretap-
ping aimed at targets that are not “United States persons” overseas absent the 
traditional elements of probable cause.87 The plaintiffs, United States persons 
under the statutory definition, feared that FISA would eventually lead the gov-
ernment to capture their conversations as well, in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and the text of the statute itself.88 They sought a declaration that 
the FISA provisions at issue were facially unconstitutional and an injunction 
prohibiting any further collection of data pursuant to them.89 
The Court did not reach any of the merits of the constitutional claims re-
lated to FISA, and instead disposed of the case by holding that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing to sue because their asserted future injuries were too specula-
tive.90 Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the five-member majority, emphasized 
that future injuries must be “certainly impending,” and that the definition of 
imminent “cannot be stretched beyond its purpose,” so that it defeats the pri-
mary purpose of ensuring compliance with Article III.91 
Clapper cited to Whitmore v. Arkansas, decided by the Supreme Court in 
1990, for the “certainly impending” standard. 92 In that case, the Court ex-
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142, 1146–47 (2013); see also Bradford 
C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or Three Competing Philosophies of Standing Law?, 
81 TENN. L. REV. 211, 221 (2014) (explaining that, prior to Clapper, the Court had never defined the 
imminent injury test outlined in Lujan). 
 86 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1145–46. 
 87 Id. at 1144. 
 88 Id. at 1144–45. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) defines a “United States 
person” as “a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . , an 
unincorporated association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States 
or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the 
United States.” 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(i) (West 2015). 
 89 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146. 
 90 See id. at 1143, 1147–48 (concluding that “respondents’ theory of standing, which relies on a 
highly attenuated chain of possibilities, does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be 
certainly impending”). 
 91 Id. at 1147 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992)). 
 92 See id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). In Whitmore, the Court dis-
missed a death row inmate’s attempt to intervene on behalf of another condemned prisoner’s behalf. 
495 U.S. at 166. The petitioner inmate argued that, if his own federal habeas corpus petition was ap-
proved, he would receive a new trial. Id. at 156–57. If at the end of his second trial he was again con-
victed and sentenced to death, he would receive additional review from the Arkansas Supreme Court, 
which would compare his crime and sentence to other crimes that received death sentences in Arkan-
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plained that “allegations of possible future injury,” that are the final results of 
long, speculative casual chains are insufficient to support Article III standing.93 
In analyzing the plaintiffs’ arguments for standing based on future injury in 
Clapper, the Court found that their theories relied on a similarly improbable 
series of events occurring before they suffered an actual injury.94 For example, 
the Court noted that even if the plaintiffs could show that the government in-
tended to seek FISA Court approval to tap their communications, they could 
not know whether the FISA Court would approve the government’s request.95  
In addition, the court was concerned that, even if the plaintiffs’ data was 
collected (and an injury in fact was present), there would be no way to know if 
it was collected pursuant to the challenged FISA provisions or some other stat-
utory vehicle.96 Such indeterminacy would violate the second prong of the 
Lujan test, which requires a causal connection between (in this case) the chal-
lenged statute and the plaintiffs’ injuries.97 
The Court was also not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ alternative arguments 
that, because of the FISA statutory scheme, they were forced to assume that 
their data was collected, and thus to take appropriate protective measures.98 It 
found those allegations factually insufficient and based on speculation, and 
declined to allow plaintiffs to “manufacture” an injury in fact by taking pre-
ventative measures in response to feared future harms.99 
Some commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court intended to 
resolve the dispute with respect to future injury standing when it decided 
                                                                                                                           
sas. Id. He argued that, if such relief and review were granted, he would be harmed if the condemned 
prisoner on whose behalf he sought to intervene chose to forego a final round of post-conviction re-
lief, because that crime would not be included in the state supreme court’s “database” of capital 
crimes. Id. The Court deemed this chain of events far too speculative to support third party standing in 
the other condemned prisoner’s case. See id. at 157. The Court’s “certainly impending” language in 
Whitmore is drawn from an early twentieth century decision, 1923’s Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 
where the court ruled that actual present injury is not required to satisfy Article III. Id. at 158; Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923). 
 93 See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158; see also Clapper, 136 S. Ct. at 1147–48 (citing Whitmore, 
among other cases, for the proposition that injury-in-fact standing theories predicated on the future 
occurrence of inference after inference are insufficient for Article III purposes). 
 94 See Clapper, 135 S. Ct. at 1148–50 (reviewing the five ways in which the plaintiff’s injury 
theory rested on speculative chains of causation). 
 95 Id. at 1149–50. 
 96 Id. at 1149. 
 97 Id.; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (requiring alleged injuries to be “fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 98 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150–51. The respondent journalists and non-profits argued that because 
the government had the power to collect information related to non-citizens overseas and because they 
made regular contact with such individuals likely to be included in the surveillance, their own com-
munications were likely to be intercepted. Id. at 1144–46. Accordingly, plaintiff organizations stopped 
communicating electronically with certain non-U.S. contacts, instead incurring the cost to travel and 
meet in person. Id. 
 99 Id. at 1151. 
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Clapper.100 Nevertheless, the case has both served as the primary justification 
for dismissals in data breach cases at the pleading stage and been cited as justi-
fication for upholding standing in others, leaving the uncertainty unresolved.101 
Some courts that have found sufficient standing even in light of Clapper had 
standing precedents for data breach plaintiffs that were well-established before 
the case was decided.102  
In Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit determined that its future injury jurisprudence in data 
breach cases survived the Supreme Court’s holding in Clapper.103 The Seventh 
Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Remijas in its 2016 decision in Lewert v. P.F. 
Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., reiterating that increased risk of future data misap-
propriation is sufficient to confer Article III standing under Clapper.104 District 
courts in the Ninth Circuit have expressed a similar view with respect to the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 2010 decision Krottner v. Starbucks.105 Some 
California district courts have noted that Clapper did not overrule any existing 
precedent or establish any new Article III standing framework, and concluded 
that “certainly impending” future injuries continue to provide adequate stand-
ing.106 One court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, has applied 
Clapper in the absence of prior circuit precedent and concluded that future in-
juries meet the Supreme Court’s demanding standard.107 
By contrast, a series of district court decisions in states other than Cali-
fornia have found that Clapper precludes the future misappropriation theory of 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See Mank, supra note 85, at 264 (arguing that “[t]he text of the Clapper majority opinion sug-
gested that the ‘certainly impending’ injury requirement is generally applicable to all standing cases”). 
 101 Compare In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12–cv–8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished memorandum and order dismissing a claim for future injuries in 
light of Clapper), with Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(finding that Seventh Circuit data breach standing in future injuries cases survived the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Clapper), and In re Adobe Systems, Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1212 
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding that Ninth Circuit precedent regarding data breach standing and future inju-
ries was valid after Clapper). See Angelo A. Stio III et al., supra note 58, at 49–50 (noting that many 
district courts have allowed motions to dismiss on standing grounds in the wake of Clapper). 
 102 See Adobe Systems, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1212; see also Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 
629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding a future injury theory sufficient to establish standing). But see Galar-
ia v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Nos. 15-3386 & 15-3387, 2016 WL 4728027, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 
2016) (citing Clapper to uphold standing in the absence of established circuit precedent). 
 103 See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 692–693. 
 104 Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 966–67 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 105 See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010); see also In re Sony 
Gaming Networks & Consumer Data Security Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961–62 (S.D. Cal. 
2014) (reaffirming a prior finding of Article III standing in light of Clapper); Adobe Systems, 66 
F. Supp. 3d at 1213–14 (citing Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 961). 
 106 See, e.g., Adobe Systems, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1213–14 (citing Sony Gaming Networks, 996 
F. Supp. 2d at 961) (“[T]he Court is reluctant to conclude that Clapper represents the sea change that 
Adobe suggests.”). 
 107 Galaria, 2016 WL 4728027, at *3. 
2017] Standing in the Future 299 
standing.108 While a circuit opinion precisely on point that finds a lack of 
standing has yet to issue, it seems clear that Clapper has turned the tide against 
plaintiffs in a great number of data breach class action cases where the pre-
existing law of the circuit was already against them.109 
III. FOOTNOTE FIVE: AN INTERMEDIATE STANDARD? 
 This Part first considers the standing theories evident in both the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s 2013 majority opinion in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA 
and in Justice Breyer’s dissent in that case, and notes that the splintered deci-
sion reflects at least two historically conflicting visions of Article III’s limita-
tions.110 Nevertheless, a close examination of the Clapper majority opinion’s 
inclusion of footnote five suggests the presence of a third standing theory with 
roots in the Court’s environmental jurisprudence, that may have been included 
to secure Justice Kennedy’s vote.111 That theory, called the “substantial risk” 
theory may have survived Clapper’s perceived narrowing of the federal court-
house doors.112 This Part examines how such a rule might, at least in theory, 
apply to some data breach class actions.113 
Justice Alito, writing for the majority in Clapper, emphasized that the Court 
has often articulated the “certainly impending” standard, and that the Court was 
not announcing any new law or working a major change in its standing jurispru-
dence.114 Consequently, it is possible to view the result in Clapper as merely 
an affirmation of the Court’s prior jurisprudence, and a reminder to the lower 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See, e.g., Barnes & Noble, 2013 WL 4759588 (concluding that “actual injury in the form of 
increased risk of identity theft is insufficient to establish standing”); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2014), rev’d, 2016 WL 4728027 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding 
that “an increased risk of identity theft, identity fraud, medical fraud or phishing is not itself an injury 
in fact because Named Plaintiffs did not allege—or offer facts to make plausible—an allegation that 
such harm is ‘certainly impending’”). 
 109 See Heidi J. Milicic, Standing to Bring Data Breach Class Actions Post-Clapper, ABA SEC. 
LITIG.: COMMERCIAL & BUS. (Aug. 7, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/
commercial/articles/summer2014-0814-data-breach-class-actions-post-clapper.html [https://perma.cc/
BP5Y-QPZ9] (noting high rates of successful standing challenges by data breach defendants in wake 
of Clapper). 
 110 See infra notes 114–170 and accompanying text. 
 111 See infra notes 114–170 and accompanying text. 
 112 See infra notes 134–170 and accompanying text. 
 113 See infra notes 134–170 and accompanying text. 
 114 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013); see also id. at 1150 (noting 
the Court’s “usual reluctance” to accept contingent theories of standing). 
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courts of the judiciary’s proper role in a constitutional democracy.115 The dis-
senters in Clapper, however, felt differently.116 
Justice Breyer, writing in dissent for himself and three other justices, 
acknowledged that the Court continues to use the same language to describe 
the requirement for a well-pleaded injury in fact: the injury must be “certainly 
impending.”117 He argued, however, that the Clapper majority changed the 
semantic meaning of the word “certainly,” and produced a significantly more 
restrictive standing jurisprudence as a result.118 Surveying a series of landmark 
standing cases, Justice Breyer maintained that the Court has used the word 
“certainly” in a variety of ways across cases, but that it has never intended it to 
mean absolute certainty.119 Broadly speaking, he argued that “certainly” is 
meant to emphasize the word “impending,” which immediately follows.120 In 
essence, he suggested that the imminence requirement for injury in fact is in-
tended to point to the basic constitutional requirement that a case or controver-
sy be readily cognizable to a reviewing court.121 Injuries too distant in time or 
lacking in reasonable probability, like those arising in a future campaign for 
reelection (which might or might not occur at all) are not “certainly impend-
ing.”122 In other words, it is uncertain if such an injury is impending at all.123 
Justice Breyer suggested that many future-risk-of-injury cases have met 
this more elastic standard.124 He pointed to the fact that the future is, after all, 
inherently uncertain, but that this baseline indeterminacy of forthcoming 
events has never stopped the federal judiciary from issuing injunctions to pre-
vent impending harms (as in environmental cases) or for hearing requests for 
declaratory relief (as in the case of facially unconstitutional laws).125 Instead of 
requiring certainty in the absolute sense as the majority appears to do, Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See Mank, supra note 85, at 242–44 (observing that both the majority and dissent in Clapper 
cite Lujan heavily, and that both cases express the importance of the standing inquiry for judicial 
compliance with Article III, in addition to ensuring the separation of powers). 
 116 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[C]ertainty is not, and never has 
been, the touchstone of standing.”). 
 117 Id. 
 118 See id. at 1161 (arguing that the Majority’s interpretation of the word “certainly” is too literal). 
 119 See id. at 1160–61 (pointing out some of the Court’s cases that interpret the term “certainly”).  
 120 Id. at 1161 (“Taken together the case law uses the word ‘certainly’ as if it emphasizes, rather 
than literally defines, the immediately following term ‘impending.’”). 
 121 See id. at 1155–56 (explaining that standing doctrine “helps to ensure that the legal questions 
presented to the federal courts will not take the form of abstract intellectual problems”). 
 122 See id.  at 1160 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 
93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). 
 123 See id. 
 124 See id. at 1160–61. 
 125 See id. 
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Breyer advocated for a “reasonably likely” or “highly likely” standard.126 He 
concluded that the plaintiffs in Clapper met this standard.127 
Clapper thus presents at least two divergent views of the constitutional 
dimensions of standing.128 Justice Alito and the majority appear to suggest that 
future injuries do not generate standing to sue unless they are almost certain to 
occur.129 The majority’s reasoning in Clapper mirrors other rule-based standing 
theories that are intended to curtail the reach of the federal judiciary and ensure 
the separation of powers.130 Chief among these is Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, where the Court put great emphasis 
on the standing doctrine’s traditional role of limiting the province of the feder-
al courts to cases actually in controversy.131 By contrast, Justice Breyer and the 
dissenters in Clapper would embrace a more liberal standing jurisprudence for 
future injuries, and require only a “reasonable probability” of the injury occur-
ring.132 Observers have dubbed this the probabilistic approach to standing and 
noted its pragmatic or legal realist underpinnings.133 
At least one commentator, however, has suggested that there is a third 
theory of standing lurking in the shadows of what appears to be a relatively 
straightforward ideological split in the Court.134 In footnote five of the majori-
ty opinion in Clapper, Justice Alito seemed to acknowledge that absolute cer-
tainty might not be required in all cases.135 He admitted that, in certain circum-
                                                                                                                           
 126 See id. at 1160. (“[T]hat degree of certainty is all that is needed to support standing here.”). 
 127 Id. at 1165. 
 128 See id. at 1148 (majority opinion); id. at 1160 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Mank, supra 
note 85, at 215 (“[T]he Clapper decision presented two familiar approaches to standing.”). 
 129 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143, 1147 (majority opinion). 
 130 See id. at 1147; see also Mank, supra note 85, at 240 (noting similarities between the Court’s 
rationale in Clapper and the separation of powers arguments made by Justice Antonin Scalia and 
Chief Justice Roberts). 
 131 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (explaining the nexus between 
the standing doctrine and separation of powers); see also Mank, supra note 85, at 242–43 (examining 
Justice Scalia’s scholarship espousing standing as a means of ensuring separation of powers in rela-
tion to his opinion for the Court in Lujan). 
 132 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1165 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 133 See F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 65–70 (2012) (provid-
ing an overview of the probabilistic approach to standing). 
 134 See, e.g., Mank, supra note 85, at 215–16 (arguing that Clapper’s footnote five implies a third 
theory of standing). 
 135 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5. The full text of footnote five reads: 
Our cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literally certain 
that the harms they identify will come about. In some instances, we have found stand-
ing based on a “substantial risk” that the harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs 
to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm. But to the extent that the “sub-
stantial risk” standard is relevant and is distinct from the “clearly impending” require-
ment, respondents fall short of even that standard, in light of the attenuated chain of in-
ferences necessary to find harm here. In addition, plaintiffs bear the burden of pleading 
and proving concrete facts showing that the defendant’s actual action has caused the 
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stances, the Court has “found standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the 
harm will occur . . . .”136 
Some legal scholars speculate that the language of footnote five was add-
ed to secure Justice Kennedy’s vote for the majority.137 It is true that Justice 
Kennedy has often proved the swing vote in a wide range of standing-related 
cases.138 His vote to allow the House of Representatives to defend the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act in United States v. Windsor is particularly illustra-
tive.139 His dissent in the companion case, Hollingsworth v. Perry, which dis-
missed a challenge to California’s Proposition 8 on standing grounds, also in-
dicates Justice Kennedy’s willingness to entertain a somewhat expansive view 
of standing in some cases.140 
Other writers suggest that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan indi-
cated he is receptive to the idea that Congress may grant standing through stat-
ute where the common law ordinarily would not.141 One author speculates that 
Justice Kennedy voted against the plaintiffs in Clapper because Congress did 
not provide a well-articulated and narrowly-drawn private right of action with-
in the statutory text of FISA.142 
Still others note that footnote five helps to “square” Clapper’s holding 
with a long line of Supreme Court decisions upholding standing in environ-
                                                                                                                           
substantial risk of harm. Plaintiffs cannot rely on speculation about “the unfettered 
choices made by independent actors not before the court.” 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 136 Id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153 (2010)). 
 137 Mank, supra note 85, at 260; see also Clapper and Remijas: A Footnote in the Door for Data 
Breach Plaintiffs, ABA SEC. LITIG.: MASS TORTS LITIG. (Nov. 10, 2015), http://apps.americanbar.org/
litigation/committees/masstorts/articles/fall2015-1115-clapper-remijas-footnote-door-data-breach-
plaintiffs.html [https://perma.cc/BP5Y-QPZ9] [hereinafter ABA, Clapper and Remijas] (“The foot-
note, an unusual concession that undercuts the [Court’s] newly minted standard, feels out of place and 
may have been inserted to hold the narrow majority in light of Justice Breyer’s dissent.”). 
 138 See Jonathan H. Adler, Standing Still in the Roberts Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1061, 
1070 (2009) (“Here, as in other areas, Justice Kennedy is the median Justice whose views determine 
the outcome in close cases.”). 
 139 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685–86, 2688 (concluding that the govern-
ment’s failure to pay tax refunds to same-sex couples preserved an Article III injury, despite the gov-
ernment’s acknowledgment that the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional); see also Mank, 
supra note 85, at 261 (noting Justice Kennedy’s distinction in Windsor between judicially created 
prudential standing rules and Article III’s more narrow constitutional demands). 
 140 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that a 
California law allowing private citizens to defend the constitutionality of initiative legislation where 
the State executive fails to enforce it confers Article III standing in federal court); see also Heather 
Elliot, Federalism Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 435, 444–45 (2014) (examining Justice Kennedy’s will-
ingness to grant ballot initiative proponents standing to defend a California law where the state re-
fused to do so). 
 141 See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1023, 1054–55 (2009). 
 142 Mank, supra note 85, at 259. 
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mental cases.143 As one scholar explained, environmental cases frequently al-
lege injuries that are prospective and non-economic in nature.144 Often, plain-
tiffs allege an increased risk of future injuries due to agency rulemaking or de-
fendant conduct.145 The Court, in a series of cases including 1972’s Sierra 
Club v. Morton and 2000’s Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services (TOC), Inc. explicitly acknowledged the sufficiency of future injuries 
for the purposes of satisfying Article III in the environmental context.146 Both 
Sierra Club and Laidlaw even acknowledged that, at least in environmental 
cases, mere aesthetic degradation of the resource may be sufficient to establish 
injury in fact.147 
In Sierra Club, an environmental group challenged federal approval of a 
plan to develop an area of the Sequoia National Park into a ski area under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.148 The plaintiffs argued that the development 
“would destroy or otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic 
objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the enjoyment of the park for 
future generations.”149 While the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the 
Sierra Club lacked standing to sue because it had failed to allege that any of its 
members actually used the area in question (something they presumably could 
have established but neglected), the Court did acknowledge that aesthetic fu-
ture injuries were sufficient to confer standing under Article III.150 In Laidlaw, 
the Court was confronted with similar alleged injuries, this time upholding 
standing.151 In that case, environmental groups brought “citizen suits” under 
the Clean Water Act alleging that Laidlaw was discharging toxic chemicals 
into the North Tyger River in violation of permit obligations.152 Laidlaw ar-
gued that the environmental groups had not suffered an injury in fact, but the 
Court concluded that “environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact 
when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Jeremy P. Jacobs, Wiretap Ruling Could Haunt Environmental Lawsuits, GREENWIRE 
(May 20, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059981453 [https://perma.cc/MN3W-NRYC]. 
 144 See Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law in the Supreme Court, 
19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 619, 636 (2002). 
 145 See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 615, 616 (2d 
Cir. 1965) (finding that plaintiffs had established standing where they had demonstrated sufficient 
interest in natural resources that might be negatively impacted by the construction of a power plant). 
 146 See Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000) 
(finding standing where river pollution from a hazardous waste incineration facility increased likeli-
hood that petitioner recreational river users would be affected in their use of the resource); Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734, 741 (1972) (holding that standing exists for future injuries in environ-
mental cases, but denying Article III standing on other grounds). 
 147 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183; Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735. 
 148 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 729–30. 
 149 Id. at 734. 
 150 See id. at 734–35. 
 151 See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184. 
 152 Id. at 174–77. 
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aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the challenged 
activity.”153 In both cases, the Court found the traditional standing doctrine 
difficult to reconcile with the often non-monetary and non-physical injuries 
alleged in environmental cases, and adjusted the traditional rule accordingly.154 
Justice Alito went to considerable lengths to distinguish Laidlaw in the text 
of the Court’s decision in Clapper.155 Justice Alito noted that both sides conced-
ed that pollution was occurring in Laidlaw, and the only standing issue before 
the Court was whether citizens’ future choice to avoid recreational activities in 
the polluted water constituted sufficient injury to satisfy Article III.156 By con-
trast, the government certainly did not admit in Clapper that it was gathering 
communications made by American media organizations and lawyers to contacts 
overseas.157 Indeed, had Clapper been decided on the merits, this likely would 
have been the crux of the case.158 Consequently, the Clapper majority viewed 
the injury theory in Laidlaw as much more tangibly tied to actual defendant mis-
conduct than the plaintiff’s theory in the case before them.159 This apparent ef-
fort to uphold the result in Laidlaw, coupled with the language in footnote five, 
has led some observers to conclude that there is a majority of the Court willing 
to maintain an expanded “substantial risk” standing analysis for future injuries in 
environmental cases and perhaps a limited subset of other cases.160 Indeed, some 
say that the Clapper majority intentionally declined to overrule its prior standing 
jurisprudence in environmental cases.161 
This observation is buttressed by the Court’s clear focus on the national 
security and foreign affairs implications of the precise facts in Clapper.162 The 
Court noted its history of deference to the Executive in matters of state and 
security on multiple occasions, and explained that its standing doctrine is “es-
                                                                                                                           
 153 Id. at 184 (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735). 
 154 See Lazarus, supra note 144, at 636 (outlining the Court’s original approach to standing in 
environmental cases, but noting that the Court has tightened those requirements in recent years). 
 155 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1153 (acknowledging that “Laidlaw is . . . quite unlike the present 
case”). 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See id. at 1155–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he basic question is whether the injury, i.e., the 
interception, is actual or imminent”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 159 See Mank, supra note 85, at 232–33 (noting a distinction between Laidlaw, where pollution of 
the river was not in dispute, and Clapper, where the government did not acknowledge tapping plain-
tiffs’ communications). 
 160 See id. at 260 (observing that Justice Kennedy was the only Justice to join the majority in both 
Laidlaw and Clapper, and that footnote five may have been an attempt to avoid “stepping on prece-
dent”); see also Jacobs, supra note 143 (quoting academics who believe the Court was attempting to 
preserve its environmental precedent). 
 161 See Jacobs, supra note 143; Mank, supra note 85, at 260. 
 162 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (“[W]e have often found a lack of standing in cases in which 
the Judiciary has been requested to review actions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence 
gathering and foreign affairs.”) (citations omitted). 
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pecially rigorous” when plaintiffs seek to challenge the actions of the elected 
branches in this arena.163 The Court’s emphasis on the national security context 
in Clapper suggests that the case might be more limited to its facts than the 
text of the opinion suggests at first glance.164 
Footnote five and Justice Alito’s efforts to distinguish Laidlaw leave open 
the possibility that there are five votes to sustain a less rigorous “substantial 
risk” standing theory in cases that do not involve areas of traditional judicial 
deference.165 Such a theory might more closely resemble Justice Breyer’s 
probabilistic formulation.166 If this is the case, district courts have placed too 
great an emphasis on the result in Clapper when considering standing for 
plaintiffs in data breach cases.167 Instead of announcing a new rule of law that 
significantly tightens the standing requirements for plaintiffs across the board, 
Clapper might fairly be read as reiterating the Court’s long held view that the 
federal courts should, as a general rule, avoid wading into matters of national 
security and foreign affairs.168 Footnote five, on this interpretation, is the 
Court’s less-than-obvious signaling that at least some cases not involving na-
tional security matters will be evaluated under the more forgiving substantial 
risk theory.169 This interpretation, if valid, requires a careful reexamination of 
the prevailing trend in the district courts of dismissing data breach cases for 
lack of Article III standing.170 
IV. PUBLIC HARMS AND ABSTRACT INJURIES: THE CASE FOR A 
SUBSTANTIAL RISK STANDARD IN DATA BREACH CLASS ACTIONS 
This Part argues that the “substantial risk” standing formulation men-
tioned in footnote five of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision Clapper v. Am-
nesty International USA applies to at least some data breach cases.171 Section A 
examines the four principle decisions cited in footnote five to illustrate the 
substantial risk framework and concludes by suggesting that certain data 
                                                                                                                           
 163 Id. 
 164 See John L. Jacobus & Benjamin B. Watson, Clapper v. Amnesty International and Data Pri-
vacy Litigation: Is a Change to the Law “Certainly Impending”?, 21 RICH. J. L. & TECH 3, 62–63 
(2014) (arguing that Clapper’s test could be plausibly limited to cases involving national security). 
 165 See Mank, supra note 85 at 26 (discussing the possibility of the Court adopting a “substantial 
risk” standard). 
 166 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1165 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Mank, supra note 85, at 264. 
 167 See, e.g., In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12–cv–8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) (finding Clapper controlling in analyzing the injury in fact alleged by plain-
tiffs in a data breach case). 
 168 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (discussing the Court’s history of not finding standing in cases 
that involve foreign affairs or national security). 
 169 See Mank, supra note 85, at 274. 
 170 See Angelo A. Stio III et al., supra note 58, at 49 (noting increasing numbers of data breach 
class action dismissals for lack of standing, and examining strategies for plaintiffs to avoid dismissal). 
 171 See infra notes 176–267 and accompanying text. 
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breach cases share similar characteristics with those cases.172 Section B ana-
lyzes the public harm factor as applied to data breach cases and argues that 
they fit squarely within the kinds of harms to which the Court often applies the 
“substantial risk” framework.173 Section C applies the same analysis with re-
spect to the private rights factor.174 Section D concludes with a brief analysis 
of the Court’s 2016 standing decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, and a collec-
tion of support for a substantial risk theory in lower federal courts.175 
A. The Substantial Risk Framework 
If the Court’s decision in Clapper was in fact meant to preserve the sub-
stantial risk theory of standing for future injuries in at least some subset of cas-
es, it follows that the theory may be available for any case that shares suffi-
ciently similar characteristics to those the Court identified as qualifying for the 
substantial risk analysis in footnote five.176 
The text of footnote five explicitly mentions four cases.177 In 2010, in 
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, the Supreme Court considered a dis-
trict court injunction prohibiting a federal regulatory agency from partially de-
regulating genetically modified seeds while an environmental impact study 
was pending.178 The seed manufacturers appealed and argued that the district 
court’s injunction was overbroad.179 The plaintiffs argued at the Supreme Court 
that the manufacturers had failed to allege an adequately concrete injury, be-
cause it was unclear if the agency would in fact order partial deregulation if the 
injunction prohibiting it from doing so was modified. 180 The Court found that, 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See infra notes 176–207 and accompanying text. 
 173 See infra notes 208–224 and accompanying text. 
 174 See infra notes 225–243 and accompanying text. 
 175 See infra notes 244–267 and accompanying text. 
 176 See, e.g., Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 196 (2d Cir. 2013) (examining Babbitt v. United 
Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979), a case identified by the Clapper Court in footnote five 
as qualifying for the “substantial risk” treatment for similarities with the case sub judice). 
 177 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013) (citing Monsanto Co. v. 
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Blum v. 
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979)). 
 178 Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 146–48. Plaintiff organic farmers and environmental groups sued to 
prevent the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service from deregulating the use of alfalfa seeds that 
are resistant to weed killer, because the agency failed to perform an environmental impact study as 
required by federal law. Id. The plaintiffs’ suit was based on the theory that the genetically modified 
seeds would eventually cross breed with organic or conventional seeds and pollute both the seed pool 
and the food chain. Id. The district court found for the plaintiffs and issued a sweeping injunction that 
prohibited the agency from allowing nearly any deregulation of the contested seeds. Id. The seed 
manufactures appealed but did not challenge the underlying finding that an impact study was required. 
Id. 
 179 Id. at 148. The manufacturers argued that the federal agency should be allowed to order partial 
deregulation while the impact study was prepared. Id. 
 180 Id. at 150. 
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because the agency had suggested in every phase of the litigation that it would 
allow partial deregulation of the seeds, there was “more than a strong likeli-
hood that [the agency] would partially deregulate [the seed] were it not for the 
district court’s injunction. The District Court’s elimination of that likelihood is 
plainly sufficient to establish a constitutionally cognizable injury.”181 
In the Court’s 1988 decision, Pennell v. City of San Jose, members of a 
landlord’s association challenged portions of the City of San Jose’s rent control 
ordinance as facially unconstitutional.182 The defendants argued that the land-
lord association and the named plaintiff had failed to make any showing that 
any of the real property they owned and leased had been subject to the chal-
lenged provisions.183 Thus, in the defendants’ view, the injury was too specula-
tive to give rise to Article III standing.184 Noting that the standing inquiry is 
not a “mechanical exercise,” Chief Justice William Rehnquist examined the 
record before the Court and determined that a “sufficient threat of actual inju-
ry” existed.185 The Court found that the plaintiffs had shown a “realistic danger 
of sustaining a direct injury . . . .”186 
The Court’s 1982 decision in Blum v. Yaretsky involved senior citizen 
Medicaid recipients who challenged reassignments to lower levels of care that 
were made without a notice or a hearing.187 The defendants argued that the 
senior citizens lacked standing because they were protected by a consent de-
cree that precluded governmental agencies from moving them to a lower level 
of care.188 The Court disagreed, finding that the risk of being moved to a lower 
level of care by the facilities themselves, or the senior’s attending physicians, 
constituted a “sufficiently substantial” threat to justify Article III standing.189 
Similarly, in 1979, in Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, the 
Court held that an Arizona law imposing strict limits on the ability of farm 
workers to unionize posed a “realistic danger” of causing an injury, even 
though the labor union had not yet tried to organize under the restrictive law.190 
The facts of these cases, and their specific inclusion in Clapper’s footnote 
five, suggest that the Court may consider two factors, among others, when de-
                                                                                                                           
 181 Id. at 152–53 (emphasis added). 
 182 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 4. The plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance’s consideration of the hardship 
to a tenant resulting from a rent increases was a facial violation of the Fifth Amendment’s takings 
clause. Id. at 4–6. 
 183 Id. at 6. 
 184 Id. 6–7. 
 185 Id. at 7–8 (emphasis added) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated by 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 377 (2014)). 
 186 Id. at 8 (quoting Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298). 
 187 Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 993. 
 188 Id. at 999. 
 189 Id. at 1000. 
 190 Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 292–93, 297–99 (emphasis added). 
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ciding whether to apply the stringent “certainly impending” standard or the 
more expansive “substantial risk” standard in the footnote.191 
The first factor is the increased risk of public harm alleged in the plead-
ings.192 In Monsanto, the Court confronted a crossroads in the American food 
supply debate.193 It reached the merits of the case by applying the substantial 
risk standard to a speculative chain of inferences.194 Likewise, in Babbitt, the 
Court dealt with the labor supply in the American food production business.195 
The second factor is an allegation of an increased risk of substantial non-
monetary, non-physical individual injuries.196 In Babbitt, the injury alleged im-
plicated the fundamental First Amendment right to organize for the purposes of 
collective bargaining.197 The injuries alleged in Blum implicated both the right to 
due process and the right to individual autonomy in medical decisions.198 
Applying this two-pronged framework to environmental cases like the 
Court’s decision in 2000 in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmen-
tal Services (TOC), Inc. reveals similarities between environmental standing 
doctrine and the analysis found in the cases cited in footnote five.199 In envi-
ronmental cases, the risk of public harm can be great, both in terms of health 
and safety and the corruption of scarce natural resources.200 In addition, indi-
vidual citizens suffer non-economic and non-physical injuries in the form of 
destruction of ecosystems, species extinction, climate change, pollution, and 
harm to animals.201 It seems unsurprising then, viewing the cases cited in foot-
                                                                                                                           
 191 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5. 
 192 See generally id. (citing cases involving public harms here the Court applied a “substantial 
risk” theory). 
 193 See Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 146–47 (concerning a dispute over genetically engineered alfalfa). 
 194 See id. at 152. A federal district court entered an injunction barring partial deregulation of 
genetically modified alfalfa by agency action. Id. at 151. Respondents argued that petitioners, the 
manufacturers of the alfalfa, could not show that the injunction caused an Article III injury because 
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 195 See Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 292–93 (dispute over an Arizona law regulating farm worker unioni-
zation). 
 196 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5 (citing cases involving non-monetary individual injuries 
where the Court applied a “substantial risk” theory); see also Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298 (injury alleged 
was prospective violation of a constitutional right). 
 197 Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298. 
 198 See Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 993 (due process rights of notice and opportunity to be heard were 
implicated by automatic, non-consensual transfers between levels of care). 
 199 See generally Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 
(2000) (giving consideration to non-economic and intangible harms). 
 200 See generally Lazarus, supra note 144 (discussing the basis for environmental suits in a varie-
ty of contexts). 
 201 See Jan G. Laitos, Standing and Environmental Harm: The Double Paradox, 31 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 55, 67 (2013) (listing categories of environmental harm). 
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note five together with the facts of Laidlaw, that the Court distinguished 
Laidlaw in its Clapper opinion.202 
Consumer data breach cases have elements of both the public harm factor 
and the individual right factor.203 Research suggests that the public suffers signif-
icant harm when hackers access large troves of individual consumer data.204 In 
addition, some moral and jurisprudential theories (in addition to Supreme Court 
precedent) suggest that an individual right to privacy and security may be violat-
ed when non-public information in made widely available.205 Data breach cases 
thus also implicate risks to non-monetary, non-physical individual rights without 
crossing into the arenas traditionally afforded judicial deference (as the data col-
lection in Clapper arguably did).206 Consequently, consumer data breach class 
actions appear to fit well within the framework of cases that the Court has indi-
cated may be subjected to the “substantial risk” standard for future injuries.207 
B. Public Harms 
Much of the attention generated by recent large consumer data breach 
cases has focused on the cost to the affected companies themselves.208 A recent 
study by Ponemon Institute in collaboration with IBM found that each data 
breach cost companies in the United States $3.79 million on average, and that 
the cost of data breaches has increased 23% globally since 2013.209 When 
these costs are incurred because of mismanaged or inadequately protected con-
sumer data, the whole economy feels the effects of the corporate negligence.210 
                                                                                                                           
 202 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1153; Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184; see also Mank, supra note 85, at 
260 (examining how the Court in Clapper distinguished the case from Laidlaw). 
 203 See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 32. 
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from data breaches). 
 205 See infra notes 235–243 and accompanying text (examining various theories of privacy 
rights). 
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per’s footnote five). 
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FORTUNE (Mar. 27, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/27/how-much-do-data-breaches-actually-cost-big-
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 209 PONEMON INST., 2015 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL ANALYSIS 1 (May 2015), 
https://nhlearningsolutions.com/Portals/0/Documents/2015-Cost-of-Data-Breach-Study.PDF [https://
perma.cc/XND2-NV6W]. 
 210 See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 32, at 16–19 (discussing how the costs of a data breach are 
spread among different parties involved). 
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One estimate puts the total cost to the global economy from data breaches at as 
much as $2 trillion in the next five years.211 
Research indicates that the costs of a significant data breach are borne by 
entities throughout a complicated chain of payment processors, banks, card 
issuers, and the merchants themselves.212 As these costs to companies are cer-
tainly increasing, so too are less tangible costs to the general public.213 
It is true that individual consumers face relatively small monetary damag-
es when their data is stolen, as credit issuers, banks, and the merchants them-
selves are generally responsible for the cost of mitigating any damage that re-
sults from a breach.214 Companies that are the victims of external hacking or 
internal theft may offer their customers credit monitoring services and identity 
theft protection.215 Nevertheless, companies that store information irresponsi-
bly, or fail to police the conduct of internal employees, adequately expose con-
sumers to considerable stress and undermine public confidence in electronic 
transactions.216 
A recent survey of American consumers found that 79% of respondents 
would never use a credit or charge card again with a company that had suffered 
a data breach.217 Another survey found that the number of survey respondents 
afraid of becoming victims of identity theft nearly doubled after a breach 
where the breached entity held the respondent’s private data.218 Almost 40% of 
respondents to the same survey indicated that they spent time resolving prob-
lems caused by a breach, and more than 75% reported feeling stress as a result 
of the data compromise.219 This data suggests that consumer data breaches 
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cause widespread harm to the public at large, both through increased costs dis-
tributed throughout the economy, and through deflated consumer confi-
dence.220 
These public harms are similar to the kinds of harms identified in many en-
vironmental cases.221 The Supreme Court has identified the loss of recreational 
and aesthetic value as justiciable injuries, in addition to a broadly defined “envi-
ronmental wellbeing.”222 These harms are not individualized, though the Court 
does continue to require an individual plaintiff to show that they are among the 
group more broadly harmed.223 Instead, these injuries apply to a large group of 
the recreating public, who stand to lose access to significant natural resources.224 
C. Abstract Injuries 
In addition to cases that challenge governmental or private conduct that 
creates an increased risk of public harm, the cases cited by the Court in foot-
note five implicate non-economic and non-physical rights of individuals.225 In 
Babbitt, for example, the court dealt with both the economic injury created by 
restrictive unionization laws and the more fundamental right to freedom of 
association implicit in the ability to organize for the purpose of collectively 
bargaining.226 In Blum, the Court addressed a technical piece of administrative 
law, but also confronted the much more fundamental right of individual auton-
omy in making personal medical decisions.227 
Likewise, in environmental cases, the Court has been forced to develop a 
theory of standing that does not turn on economic or physical injury in the tra-
ditional sense.228 Instead, more abstract injuries are contemplated, like aesthet-
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ic damage or dilution of a natural resource.229 Standing based on abstract inju-
ries, according to some commentators, has proven to be one of the most essen-
tial aspects of the modern development in environmental law.230 
The future injuries asserted by data breach plaintiffs often turn on the in-
creased risk of monetary damages if their personal data are misappropriated.231 
Plaintiffs seldom argue that the increased risk that their private data is now, or 
will become, public constitutes an injury in and of itself.232 This abstract, non-
economic and non-physical injury is precisely the kind of injury often asserted 
in the cases the Court has indicated might receive a “substantial risk” standing 
analysis.233 Plaintiffs could plausibly argue that the increased risk of publica-
tion is, without any further showing, an injury for Article III purposes.234 
Such an argument would find support both in the legal ethical literature 
and in analogous case law from the basic law of torts.235 Some ethicists have 
suggested that mere publication of private information is an invasion of indi-
vidual rights, and that corporate custodians of that data have a moral responsi-
bility to protect it.236 Plaintiffs whose private information is compromised 
through a data breach are at a significantly increased risk of future publica-
tion.237 Further disclosure of that information might be embarrassing or com-
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promising in non-economic or non-physical ways, and yet still be properly 
characterized as an injury.238 
This logic is traceable to the common law torts for intrusion upon seclu-
sion and the publication of private affairs.239 The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
attaches liability for the invasion into the private affairs of an individual with-
out publication of the information as well as for the publication of a matter 
concerning the private life of an individual.240 Taken together, these provisions 
seem to attach legal protection to the private information of an individual.241 
Even though data made public through a breach does not result in economic 
harm to the plaintiffs, they might nonetheless suffer the invasion of a legally 
protected right.242 In much the same way that an environmental plaintiff can 
assert standing even though his or her injuries are not pecuniary, a data breach 
plaintiff might assert standing based on the substantial risk that further publica-
tion of his or her private information may occur.243 
D. Support in the Case Law 
The Supreme Court’s recently addressed standing in 2016’s Spokeo, Inc. 
v. Robins.244 In Spokeo, the Court reversed a U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit decision that found Article III standing where the plaintiff al-
leged that an Internet search engine listed inaccurate information about his 
credit history, in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.245 The Ninth Cir-
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 245 Id. at 1550. 
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cuit concluded that the search engine’s pure statutory violation was sufficient 
to confer standing.246 
The petitioners in Spokeo argued that plaintiff had not alleged the “con-
crete harm” required by the Court’s 2002 decision Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life.247 In other words, the petitioner maintained that the plaintiff had not suf-
fered any actual harm as the result of the bare statutory violation.248 The plain-
tiff argued that his alleged injuries, including reputational harm and other in-
tangible damages, amounted to an injury in fact under the traditional analysis 
outlined in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.249 
The Supreme Court handled the case cautiously, perhaps in light of the 
fact that the Court sat and decided the case with only eight justices.250 Ulti-
mately, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion failed to address 
Lujan’s “concrete injury” requirement, and remanded the case.251 Nevertheless, 
the Court emphasized that the concreteness requirement “does not mean, how-
ever, that the risk of real harm cannot satisfy” Article III’s requirements.252 The 
Court’s citation for that proposition: Clapper.253  
The Court’s acknowledgement in Spokeo that Clapper supports a substan-
tial risk theory of injury was accompanied by the observation that plaintiffs 
often allege intangible injuries in tort cases.254 This observation buttresses the 
claim that tort law may provide a foundation for data breach injury in fact, as 
suggested in the previous section of this Note.255 
 At the federal circuit level, courts have taken divergent views on Clap-
per’s standing requirements.256 Some appear to hew more closely to the “cer-
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tainly impending” standard, and the law of future injury standing in those ju-
risdictions may have narrowed as a result.257 At least a few circuits, however, 
appear to agree that the Supreme Court preserved the substantial risk test for at 
least some subset of cases.258 
 Most directly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held, in 
an unpublished 2016 opinion, that Clapper preserved a substantial risk injury 
theory that supported Article III standing in a data breach class action, where 
the alleged injuries turned on increased risk of future data misuse.259 That 
opinion from the Sixth Circuit cited Clapper’s footnote five in support of its 
holding.260 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explicitly 
applied the substantial risk test in the context of a data breach analysis, and 
cited to Clapper while doing so.261 That court concluded that the Supreme 
Court had no intention of eliminating the “substantial risk” analysis, let alone 
foreclosing the use of future injuries to establish standing altogether.262 
The Sixth and Seventh Circuit decisions, in combination with several dis-
trict court decisions in California, indicate that the issue remains unsettled in the 
lower federal courts.263 The Court’s Spokeo decision did little to resolve the heart 
of the issue: what, precisely, constitutes a sufficient future injury in the data 
breach context to confer Article III standing?264 It is likely that the Supreme 
Court will be faced with a petition for certiorari that is squarely on point in the 
near future.265 The Court will then have a chance to clarify whether or not the 
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substantial risk analysis applies in the particular context of consumer data breach 
class actions.266 Given the implications of its prior holdings, the Court ought to 
include at least some data breach cases in the substantial risk category.267 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International 
USA may have substantially tightened the pleading requirements for Article III 
standing in certain cases. In others, however, a more flexible substantial risk 
theory of injury arguably applies. This less rigorous approach to standing ap-
pears to hold in some environmental cases, as well as other cases that invoke 
significantly increased risk of public harm. It may also apply in cases where 
the plaintiff alleges abstract injuries that are non-economic and non-physical in 
nature. Consumer data breach cases appear to satisfy both of these elements, 
because the harm is broadly diffused throughout the economy and some of the 
injuries alleged are non-economic and non-physical. Consequently, federal 
district courts should apply a substantial risk analysis absent definitive guid-
ance from the Supreme Court to the contrary. 
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